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The reality and hyper-reality of human rights:
public consciousness and the mass media
eric heinze
Introduction
Scholarship on international human rights generally adopts two
approaches. The normative approach focuses on treaties or other
authoritative sources. The institutional approach emphasises govern-
ments, organisations or other actors charged with the norms’ implemen-
tation. Much writing inevitably involves both approaches. Any critical
stance is then often limited either to examining obstacles within the
norms or their interpretation, or to pointing out the shortcomings of
actors responsible for implementation.
The authors of human rights scholarship are often activists, lawyers,
diplomats or judges, and may include scholars with professional
affinities to those circles. They largely confine their critical scope to
those normative or institutional levels. Some theoretical writings go
further, proposing broader frameworks, such as liberal, legal-realist,
post-Marxist, post-colonial, feminist, communitarian or deconstructio-
nist. Those analyses too, however, frequently focus either on prevailing
norms (individually or as a system) or on the performance of the relevant
actors.
In this chapter, I shall examine a third layer of activity, the mass
media. I shall treat the media as being on a par with, or more powerful
than, the dominant systems of norms, in so far as the media determine
the situations with which those norms are associated in the public mind;
and as being at least on a par with organisations and governments, in so
This chapter benefited from discussions within the Newcastle Law School’s ‘Retreat from
Human Rights’ series, session of 27 November 2009, chaired by Colin Murray. Equally
helpful was the conference ‘Law and Politics: Democracy, Human Rights and Power’,
University of Westminster, 10 June 2010, chaired by Daniela Nadj. Many thanks also to
Rob Dickinson, and to William Linton for his research assistance.
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far as the media determine which situations are most visibly and
urgently acted upon. The neglect of this decisive strand underscores
the ongoing formalism of legal practice: norms and institutions receive
the most attention, since they assume the official status proper to the
promulgation, interpretation and implementation of rights. In most
scholarship on international law and human rights, the role of the
media, lacking any such formalised status, is cited, if at all, only
tangentially.
Some international bodies, like the treaty-based Committees of the
United Nations, or the Sub-Commission on Human Rights, do exhibit
some independence from media trends.1 Their roles, however, have
remained minor. Even leading politicians scarcely know about them. In
the world of real power politics, they do not need to know about such
agencies. The Committees or the Sub-Commission may influence
cooperative states in a symbolic hope that other states will some day
follow suit; but they have wielded no real influence over the most
heinous situations and regimes, either because responsible actors are
not states party to the respective treaties,2 or because they disregard the
various agencies’ findings or recommendations, which lack any enforce-
ment mechanism. Meanwhile, bodies like the former UN Human Rights
Commission, or its successor, the Human Rights Council, grimly display
the irrelevance of any genuine and balanced picture of global human
rights to countless UN member states.3 Even high-profile NGOs, like
Amnesty International, attract only sporadic attention, and usually only
in the elite media.
To be sure, a good deal has been written on the portrayal of human
rights in the media. As of this writing, however, little of that work
appears in publications on international law or on international human
rights. It is conducted mostly by political and social scientists, and is
published in journals far from the mainstay of international lawyers. The
1 For periodically updated archives, see Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, ‘Human Rights Bodies’, at www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/
HumanRightsBodies.aspx (accessed 15 December 2010); University of Minnesota Human
Rights Library, ‘United Nations Documents’, at www1.umn.edu/humanrts/un-orgs.htm
(accessed 15 December 2010).
2 For ratification information, see United Nations Organisation (UNO), ‘United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV: Human Rights’, at http://treaties.un.org/pages/Treaties.
aspx?id=4&subid¼A&lang¼Den (accessed 15 December 2010).
3 See, e.g., Rosa Freedman, ‘Improvement on the Commission?: The UN Human Rights
Council’s inaction on Darfur’, University of California-Davis Journal of International Law &
Policy 16 (2010), 81.
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human rights community focuses upon formally empowered instru-
ments, organisations or governments, with little appreciation for the
mass consciousness of human rights that overwhelmingly decides the
issues that attract or deflect power brokers’ attention in the first instance;
which mass consciousness is a media creation. If the media lacks any
formal role, it more than compensates in its functional influence.
It is worth briefly noting two caveats. First, although I shall not
speculate further on this point, even if we were to substitute rights
discourse for a law or ethics that is less individualist or litigious in its
origins or effects, the role of the global media, unless it were organised
vastly differently than it is today, would still remain decisive. The
problem of media dominance is not a problem for human rights
per se. It would be a problem for anything conceivable, in today’s sense,
as a globally applied ethics. Accordingly, I am less interested in whether a
rights discourse is better or worse than any alternatives, and more
interested in the role the media assumes with arguable indifference to
our legal or ethical paradigms. Secondly, in discussing the role of the
media in international human rights, I shall consider them only as actors
in generating a public consciousness of human rights. This analysis will
not cover the media as, collectively, an object of legal or professional
regulation, subject to their own positive norms, such as freedom of
speech, defamation or other standards of press conduct. We must bear
in mind, however, that the two sets of questions do remain linked. The
link becomes evident in times of media blockades, or under totalitarian
regimes, since the media’s creation of a mass human rights consciousness
crucially depends on what the media can report.
Human rights in hyper-reality
In his chapter in this volume, David Kennedy warns that to frame certain
issues as raising distinct concerns about human rights can divert our
attention from other problems: ‘a well-implemented ban on the death
penalty, for example, can easily leave the general conditions of incarcer-
ation unremarked’. In that case, singling out capital punishment as a
distinct human rights issue ‘can make life-without-parole more legitim-
ate, more difficult to challenge’.4
The example of the death penalty is probative, since the two other
problems Kennedy cites, prison conditions and excessive sentences, are
4 See p.XXX in Chapter 2 above.
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themselves subject to human rights norms. The problem Kennedy evokes
is not that some important issues enjoy, while others lack, the protec-
tions of higher-law norms. We would be hard-pressed nowadays to find
an issue of any seriousness that does not in some way involve human
rights. Rather, and particularly in our world of bloated and ever-
expanding norms and instruments, the problem is that adequate atten-
tion cannot possibly be paid to all of them. What is decisive in our world
is not which norms do and do not count as human rights, but rather
which concrete situations attract attention.
Taking a converse scenario, if the media were suddenly to direct
massive and concerted attention to prison conditions or excessive
sentences, and to ignore the problem of criminal punishment, it is
the death-row inmates who would then suffer. It would not be the
sheer existence of formal norms, but rather the media that would
have created the shift. The media drive human rights because there
are already norms for virtually any situation that the media may report
or overlook, and because organisations, institutions and governments
overwhelmingly respond to the public pressures generated by the
media.
Among the broader public, and among ruling elites, dominant under-
standings of what international human rights ‘are’ have little to do with
the realities of actual abuses, and most to do with media choices. For
example, following the USA-led invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and
then of Iraq in 2003, just under 800 ‘enemy combatants’ were
imprisoned at the detention centre in Guanta´namo Bay, Cuba.5
Meanwhile, throughout that period, armed conflict in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) was counting its victims of death, torture,
rape, mutilation, orphaning and displacement in the millions.6 While
coverage of Guanta´namo during George W. Bush’s second presidential
5 See, e.g., Gordon Cucullu, Inside Gitmo: The True Story Behind the Myths of Guanta´namo
Bay (New York: Harper, 2009); Joseph Margulies, Guanta´namo and the Abuse of Presiden-
tial Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007).
6 Gerard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making
of a Continental Catastrophe (London: Oxford University Press, 2010); Phoebe Okawa.
‘Congo’s war: the legal dimension of a protracted conflict’, 77 British Yearbook of Inter-
national Law (2006) 203. See also, e.g., ‘Congo death toll up to 3.8m’, Guardian Unlimited,
10 December 2004, available at www.guardian.co.uk/congo/story/0,12292,1370528,00.html
(accessed 15 December 2010); Lydia Polgreen, ‘War’s chaos steals Congo’s young by the
millions’, New York Times, 30 July 2006, available at www.nytimes.com/2006/07/30/world/
africa/30congo.html?ex¼1311912000&en¼ b51825fef1e20057&ei¼5088&partner¼rssnyt&
emc¼rss (accessed 15 December 2010).
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term became more-or-less daily, not just in the American media, but
throughout much of the world,7 DRC went almost entirely unreported.
That kind of comparison, seemingly compassionate when the spot-
light shifts to DRC’s real victims, nevertheless breeds intractable
dilemmas. We cannot escape the embarrassment that the question
‘why should Guanta´namo receive so much attention, and Congo so
little?’ is a mere variation on the positive assertion, ‘Guanta´namo should
receive less attention!’ But who would ever voice that demand? Once an
event raises undeniably urgent questions of politics, ethics or rights, it
becomes disconcerting, and evokes a spectre of authoritarianism, to call
for less discussion of it. However noble one’s intentions might be in
encouraging coverage of other global situations, that desire would seem
to stray too close to downright complicity in the camps. After all, the
Bush administration would have relished a call for less coverage, par-
ticularly if replaced by a focus on human rights abuses by other govern-
ments. Any attempt to redress ‘too much’ reporting on Guanta´namo
would appear to undermine the democratic value of maximum discus-
sion on issues of state action or public interest. Such a shift would also
invite a grisly number-crunching game, wherein we weigh a few hundred
victims of the camps against a few million in Congo or elsewhere. Such a
calculus would degrade human rights to utilitarian, cost–benefit analyses
in order to decide who ‘deserves’ how much coverage. Comparisons are
odious.
The dilemma allows no easy resolution. We cannot approve of the
extent of the Guanta´namo coverage, so completely does it eclipse mil-
lions of other violations around the world. Yet nor can we condemn it,
since the loudest possible noise against Guanta´namo is crucial to the
self-critical dialogue without which a democracy’s essential elements of
legitimacy and accountability are destroyed.
A common attitude towards the media might be called ‘loosely plur-
alist’. We know that not every problem can be reported. Every day, the
world is cluttered with millions of problems. The sheer notion that a
given situation does or does not constitute a human rights ‘problem’
already presupposes some normative criterion that, in many cases, can
be disputed. We instead hope for some balanced mix over the long run.
Any given day’s reporting will emphasise some problems over others. So
we accept that the media are doing their job if, over time, we feel that an
7 Cf. Eric Heinze and Rosa Freedman, ‘Public awareness of human rights: distortions in the
mass media’, 14 International Journal of Human Rights (2010) 491, pp.507–8.
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overall picture has emerged, at least of the world’s gravest abuses. The
problem, of course, as ‘Guanta´namo versus Congo’ suggests, is that a
‘reasonably complete and balanced picture’ does not inevitably emerge
‘over time’.
Nor does the problem reduce to one of elite versus popular media, or
of left-wing versus right-wing media, or of privately versus publicly
owned media. Although the elite outlets may provide better pictures
than the popular press, they too privilege concerns with only tangential
bearing upon human rights. The elite New York Times, or the centre-left
Guardian, showed only marginally more interest in DRC than their more
colourful counterparts.8 The public BBC showed little more interest than
the privately operated Murdoch outlets.
Only through the media can we glean what might be called a ‘func-
tional ontology’ of human rights violations: not merely a study of norms
on paper, nor even of violations that actually ‘exist’ in the world, but
rather one (a) of those of which the existence matters, because the
world’s attention is sufficiently drawn to them; and (b) of those of which
the existence does not matter, those which do not exist in any functional
way, because the media bypass them. In theory, the falling tree makes a
sound even if no one hears it: a violation exists even if it is never
discovered or publicised. In practice, the decisive mode by which human
rights exist, the only mode of existence which makes human rights in
any way known to the public at large and to those in power, lies not in
the real, but in the so-called ‘hyper-real’ world. In hyper-reality, the
falling tree makes a sound only when someone hears it – and indeed
not just a single sound, but through steady repetition. Jean Baudrillard
sees hyper-reality, in opposition to reality, where our encounter is
fundamentally driven not by lived experience of the object in question
(for example a personal encounter with a human rights violation) but
rather through media representations.9 A pre-modern European might
have understood a report, or story, about a famine in some faraway place
by having experienced hunger at home. Today’s Western Europeans will
know hunger, or genocidal murders, rapes or limb-hackings, only
through televised images of faraway places; not as mirrors of their own
lived experiences, but through representations (‘simulacra’) of societies
experienced as alien or ‘Other’. The result is that even an existential
experience as basic, as primary to the human condition as simple bodily
8 See ibid.
9 See, e.g., Jean Baudrillard, Simulacres et simulation (Paris: E´ditions Galile´e, 1981).
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hunger will, for most in the West, be a sheer media contrivance. For
most audiences in the West, in the context of our post-industrial states,
human rights abuses are a hyper-real media invention. Even those of us
with direct experience of our own, or others’, violations will know,
through direct experience, only a tiny fragment of any genuinely global
human rights picture.
Human rights: absolute versus zero-sum
A commitment to human rights is a commitment to an ethical code. If
we believe in human rights as a matter of principle, then, on human
rights’ own terms, we cannot rate any other interest as being above them,
able to trump them. Even God’s will cannot stand above human rights in
that sense, but can only be, at best, coextensive with them. Admittedly,
some details of human rights (for example, the precise maximum
number of hours for holding detainees in pre-trial detention, or the
precise amount of money that government, or private enterprise, must
spend to accommodate the physically handicapped) may allow consider-
able variation without violating express religious precepts. By contrast, if
we believe in core human rights, but only with qualification (for
example, only in so far as we think God allows – if we believe, for
example, that God requires or permits killing people for the crime of
homosexual conduct) then, however much we might accommodate
certain positive elements of the prevailing human rights codes, our
highest ethical code is, ultimately, something other than human rights.
In that case, our ethics might maintain some degree of overlap with
human rights, but human rights as such could not be said to be the
ultimate ethical value.
If, after all, we do believe in international human rights more or less in
their dominant form, then they must represent not only a highest value,
but a universal one. There can be no principle admitting the enjoyment
of human rights in solely conditional ways (barring conditions legitim-
ated by human rights law itself, such as exceptions clauses or derogations
clauses). In other words, human rights, in principle, preclude any zero-
sum calculus. Contrary to a classical utilitarian ethics,10 and contrary to
10 See generally, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, 1999).
Rawls’s analysis amounts neither to an unqualified attack on utilitarianism, nor to the
suggestion that utilitarian calculations are altogether incompatible with liberal rights
regimes. He argues, rather, that utilitarianism in itself cannot provide an adequate
foundation for a just political order. Utilitarian considerations are feasible, then, within
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more ordinary legislative procedures beyond the core issues of human
rights (such as routine deliberations on such issues as tax rates, or
financial regulation, or zoning rules), there is no principle of fundamen-
tal human rights that can be construed as granting only some rights, on
condition that others be withheld: neither can one individual be
expected to secure some human rights solely on the condition of forgo-
ing others, nor can any group of people be denied human rights on
condition that others may enjoy them.11
In other words, even-handedness is not simply an aspiration of
human rights, but a conceptual presupposition, without which they
make no sense at all. By ‘even-handedness’, I mean not merely the
obvious element of equal enjoyment of rights by all rights holders (as
has always been expressly stated in the relevant instruments),12 but also,
and of the same stature, condemnation of all perpetrators in general
proportion to their respective levels of abuse.13 (Levels of abuse, in turn,
must be determined by taking account, for example, under legitimate
states of emergency, of states’ available means;14 or, in the case of social
and economic rights, of states’ available resources.)15
Under that principle of even-handedness, a state like Israel would
certainly have been subject to criticism and legitimate media attention,16
from the time of her creation at least into the twenty-first century, but
no more than any number of her non-democratic neighbours during
that same period, who, before the 2011 uprisings, attracted a media
spotlight mostly on their international acts, with very little attention –
certainly in comparison to that on Israel – to their internal repression.
rights regimes, but can never override rights. Utilitarianism thus becomes not altogether
destroyed by, but simply subordinated to, liberalism.
11 See generally, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1977).
12 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Arts. 1 and 2, GA Res. 217A (III), at 71,
UN Doc. A/810 (1948).
13 See generally, Eric Heinze, ‘Even-handedness and the politics of human rights’, 21
Harvard Human Rights Journal (2008) 7.
14 See, e.g., UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General comment 29: states of emergency
(Article 4)’, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001).
15 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), GA Res.
2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3,
entered into force 3 January 1976, Art. 2(1).
16 See, e.g. UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Israel’, report of 29 July 2010, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3 (2010); UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Conclusions and recommenda-
tions of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Israel’, UN Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.90 (2003).
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Once again, the ability of the media to construct such a situation is
striking. A media-disseminated phrase like ‘Occupied Territories’, dir-
ectly drawn from international law, too readily serves to distinguish
Israel from her self-declared adversaries. An ‘occupied territory’ raises
problems because an entity legitimately claiming self-determination is
denied it. Surely, however, we cannot call the people of Tunisia, Egypt,
Bahrain, Libya, Syria or Saudi Arabia (as opposed to their small ruling
elites) in any sense more self-determining than the Palestinians at any
time throughout the late twentieth or early twenty-first centuries.
As with Guanta´namo, a common claim is that the brighter media
spotlight is justified, since self-proclaimed democracies must be held to
higher ethical standards. The problem is that such a criterion, far from
applying international law, flatly contradicts it. Universal human rights
apply to all states, irrespective of political regime. Nothing in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights or its progeny suggests (and it
would be legally and conceptually absurd for them to suggest) that
internationally responsible actors acquire a privilege of lower-level scru-
tiny by formally institutionalising regimes that are repressive either of
democracy,17 or of other human rights principles. Arguably, in so far as
non-democratic states by definition contradict some of the most funda-
mental rights (notably, the right to political participation, not to men-
tion free speech and fair trials),18 lack of democracy must not lighten,
but rather should intensify, the scrutiny a state receives. (In fact, the
more one contemplates such a criterion, the more bizarre it appears:
presumably, any historian explaining the Second World War would then
have to take a hard line on The Netherlands, in view of its democratic
traditions, while mentioning Nazi Germany only in passing – ‘after all,
the Nazis never claimed to be democratic!’)
Palestinians have certainly lived in unacceptable conditions. Neverthe-
less, even conditions in other democracies, such as India or Brazil, with
far more millions of people living with comparable deprivation,19 have
scarcely received any such censure, despite the aggravation of such
17 UDHR Art. 21(1) states ‘[e]veryone has the right to take part in the government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.’
18 See UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General comment 25 (57)’ (on rights of political
participation) UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (1996).
19 See, e.g., UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Concluding observa-
tions of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Brazil’, report of
22 May 2009, UN Doc. E/C.12/BRA/CO/2 (2009); UN Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, ‘Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: India’, report of 16 May 2008, UN Doc. E/C.12/IND/CO/5 (2008).
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conditions through official corruption20 and gross disparities of
wealth.21 As there is nothing like the complexity of a military occupation
linked to the poverty in India or Brazil, they presumably have less of an
excuse, and, in any case, no better one.22 Yet not only do they suffer
nothing like pariah status, but have counted among the most highly
regarded candidates for permanent membership of a reformed UN
Security Council. By analogy, examining the daily newspaper The
Australian over an extended period, Virgil Hawkins – criticising the
limited number of narratives that qualify a story for press coverage –
approximated that 100 times more attention had been devoted to Israel
than to DRC, despite the Congo conflict claiming 1,000 times more
victims.23 Although it is sometimes suggested that the media only
spotlight stories with a ‘good guy’ and a ‘bad guy’, that view is probably
too simplistic. Hawkins’s analysis does suggest, however, that journalists
prefer a narrative of the stronger and the weaker, and either fail to
report, or misleadingly report, situations in which the power relations,
and ethical dilemmas, are more complex.
Perhaps we should not read too much into such disparate media
focus? Perhaps everyone somehow knows, deep down, that Israel is not
much worse than countless other states? The facts suggest otherwise.
20 In Transparency International’s 2009 rankings for corruption, Brazil takes 75th place
and India takes 84th place. Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions
Index 2009’, at www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009 (accessed
26 February 2011).
21 Under ICESCR Art. 2(1), a state party is bound only to ‘achieving progressively the full
realization’ of economic and social rights, and only ‘to the maximum of its available
resources’. Respect for that progressive principle becomes questionable, however, when
massive and entrenched poverty is tolerated alongside a privileged class entitled to great
accumulation of private wealth.
22 According to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘while the full
realization of the relevant rights may be achieved progressively, steps towards that goal
must be taken within a reasonably short time after the Covenant’s entry into force for the
States concerned. Such steps should be deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as
possible towards meeting the obligations recognized in the Covenant.’ Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General comment 3: the nature of states parties’
obligations’, para.2 (Fifth session, 1990), UN Doc. E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1991),
reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 14 (2003).
23 Virgil Hawkins, ‘National interest or business interest: coverage of conflict in the
Democratic Republic of Congo’ in The Australian newspaper, 2:1 Media, War & Conflict,
April 2009, 67–84, 71–2. See also, generally, Virgil Hawkins, Stealth Conflicts: How the
world’s worst violence is ignored (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008); Philip Knightley, The
First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth-maker from
the Crimea to Iraq (London: Andre Deutsch, 2003).
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A broad-based 2008 poll, commissioned by the BBC, surveying more
than 17,000 people in 34 countries, revealed that even North Korea was
perceived throughout the world as more benign, a better international
actor, than Israel.24 Without our having to deny serious abuses commit-
ted by Israel, then, such a perception nevertheless reflects not the reality
of the two countries’ comparative levels of violations, so much as the
hyper-reality of both quantitative and qualitative media coverage
devoted to the everyday lives of people living under them.25
We need not go so far as to claim that the disproportion accrues ‘to
Israel’s detriment’, at least not in an unqualified sense, since, as the
spotlight on Guanta´namo suggests, attention to human rights abuses
can never be called a detriment. Rather, we should say, ‘to the detriment
of over 20 million North Koreans’, who also have individual lives and
stories, yet whose suffering attracts only fleeting and superficial attention.
Well into the twenty-first century, North Korea may have fallen under the
occasional spotlight due to its militarism or nuclear technologies; how-
ever, if only because North Korean totalitarianism is so perfect as to
preclude press coverage, it draws remarkably little of the humanised,
day-to-day interest that global media have devoted to Israeli injustices.
It is a platitude to think that the way for a state to avoid scrutiny is by
improving its human rights. But platitudes can be false. States with good
human rights records, like Sweden26 or Norway,27 have democratic
cultures and a free press. Ironically, their media keep their populations
awash with constant domestic human rights reporting, hence incessant
internal scrutiny. The worst tactic, if a state wishes to avoid scrutiny,
24 ‘World views US “more positively”’, report of 2 April 2008, BBC News, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7324337.stm (accessed 26 February 2011). The title
of the article refers to a boost, albeit modest, in the otherwise poor image of the USA
during the final years of the George W. Bush administration.
25 See also Dov Shinar, ‘Can peace journalism make progress?: the coverage of the 2006
Lebanon War in Canadian and Israeli media’, 71:6 International Communication Gazette
October 2009, pp.451–71.
26 See, e.g., UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Sweden’, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/74/SWE/Add.1 (2003); UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Conclusions and recommendations of the Com-
mittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Sweden’, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.70
(2001).
27 See, e.g. UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding observations of the Human
Rights Committee: Norway’, UN Doc. CCPR/C/NOR/CO/5 (2006); UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Conclusions and recommendations of the Com-
mittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Norway’, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.109
(2005).
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is not to abuse rights brutally, but to abuse them carelessly. In the world
not of human rights reality, but of media-generated hyper-reality, the
best way for a state to avoid scrutiny is not to improve its conditions, but
to create a regime so perfectly and pervasively abusive that no real
reporting, by either a domestic or a foreign press, can take place at all,
and all political dissent is swatted like a fly at the first signs of life.
So it is that North Korea, Libya, Burma, Syria, and, to large extent still,
China have often avoided the exhaustive, painstaking, deeply humanised
scrutiny that their conditions would require. Israel–Palestine, then, ends
up in the same dilemma as Guanta´namo. We cannot accept less
reporting, in so far as there can never be too much critical dialogue
within and among democracies and their democratic allies; yet nor can
we accept the massive reporting focused on Israel–Palestine, in so far as
it eclipses coverage of far more abusive states, within the region and
beyond, including some of Israel’s harshest, and often – either individu-
ally or as a bloc – most powerful, critics.28
In practice, human rights may often boil down to the sheer horse-
trading of the zero-sum mindset. Certainly in its early years, the prac-
tices of the UN Human Rights Council have glaringly illustrated that
reality, as very large blocs of Israel’s adversaries, and their allies, push
their own states off the agenda while keeping Israel on it.29 However,
even if such outright trade-offs are what states or institutions often do, it
is never (again, unlike utilitarians or legislators) what they officially say
they do. They never formally embrace sheer deal-making as any part of
the international human rights movement’s declared principles or pro-
cedures, at least not in so far as they wish to be seen as promoting rights.
We can certainly acknowledge that the ideal of even-handed application
of norms and procedures currently remains far from view. At the same
time, we must recall that it remains an ideal conceptually presupposed
by human rights.
The norms and institutions of human rights law, then, may shun any
zero-sum calculus in principle. No true believer in human rights would
ever accept that one population should be given fewer human rights so
that another may enjoy more. Nevertheless, the mass media expressly
28 On the role of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in sabotaging the work of the
Human Rights Council, particularly by directing criticism at Israel in order to deflect
attention from its members and friends, see, e.g., Rosa Freedman, ‘The United Nations
Human Rights Council: a critique and early assessment’ (PhD thesis, University of
London, 2011), ch.5.
29 See generally ibid.; and Freedman, ‘Improvement on the Commission?’.
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and necessarily play that zero-sum game. And it is an inscrutable one. In
a steadily globalising era, public interest in international affairs remains
limited.30 Much of the media scarcely venture beyond a brief selection of
headlines. They cannot feasibly stray anywhere near a comprehensive
picture of global human rights. Any choice to report one situation
is perforce a choice to overlook countless others. Believers in human
rights may place them as a highest ethical value, and may shun the
principle of human rights as zero-sum; however, most of what we know
about human rights comes through sources that expressly decline to
place human rights as a highest value (regardless of the individual views
of particular editors or reporters, many of whom might well, and with
utmost sincerity, profess personal allegiance to that code), instead
subordinating human rights to the specific, overriding concerns of
journalistic interest, and thereby structuring human rights around a
rigidly zero-sum calculus.31
In the media, instead of representing the highest, unconditional
value – as that would require no other concomitant ethical or political
value to justify exhaustive coverage – human rights (even in cases of
their most egregious abuses) are routinely subordinated to other values,
such as high-profile wars (which generally entail Western involve-
ment),32 terrorism, or political corruption, all of which certainly involve
important human rights issues, but are not primarily reported for the
sake of comprehensive human rights coverage. Throughout much of the
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, a journalist covering
Libyan-sponsored terrorism, or a North Korean missile testing, might,
as an incidental matter, have dropped in some mention of those states’
mechanisms of internal repression. But those have rarely been the focus
of detailed and sustained coverage for its own sake. During that same
period, states like Belarus or Tunisia have merely had to refrain from
high-profile provocations altogether in order to avoid virtually all
30 See, e.g., Knightley, The First Casualty, pp.106–9, 118–19.
31 Even the largest news agencies do not have unlimited resources, nor do their audiences
have unlimited time or interest. Moreover, compared to a generation or two ago,
political problems today, and certainly human rights issues, are far more intricately tied
to detailed national and international legal frameworks. Yet most of us know what we
know about human rights from agencies the editors and reporters for which may hold
degrees in politics or even international relations, but have little if any specialised
training in the theory or practice of international human rights law. (A comparison
could be drawn with science or business reporters, who are generally expected to have, or
to develop, a level of background or training commensurate with the precision required.)
32 See, e.g., Heinze & Freedman, ‘Public awareness of human rights’, p.504.
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scrutiny. Even sporting events can become a kind of pretext for such
scrutiny, which supersedes and subordinates, rather than being super-
seded by and subordinated to, human rights violations. Reporting on
Tibet may have swept in with the 2008 Olympics, but swept out just as
rapidly once the Games were a humdrum memory.
Any demand that the attention paid to problems be strictly tailored to
their relative gravity would be an illusion, not least because human
rights abuses entail heavy symbolism, beyond the purely personal inter-
ests of actual and discretely identifiable victims; and the gravity of a
deeply laden symbol resists easy quantification. In 2010, for example,
a global campaign was launched to protest the Iranian sentencing of
Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani to death by stoning for adultery.33 On a
too-literal proportionality test, it would scarcely seem that the intensity
of media scrutiny was justified for just one victim. Crucial to such a
campaign, however, is that Ashtiani is not a lone victim. The protest
arguably has multiple targets. It rages not solely against her punishment,
but also against such penalties imposed on any woman, or on any
person, in Iran and arguably in other non-democratic or weakly demo-
cratic states. It can also be said to protest women’s subordination, or
harsh sexual moralities, in general, throughout the world. Moreover,
such campaigns can have preventative effects, the best result of all for
human rights, by warning Iran or other regimes that they are being
watched, possibly discouraging future repression.
On the other hand, there must be a limit to the extent to which some
victims stand as symbols for others. It would be questionable to justify
the media’s neglect of victims in China or Libya by arguing that
Guanta´namo or Palestine stand as global symbols for victims everywhere.
Moreover, we must wonder why, for example, some situations generate
no such symbols. Has the DRC, for example, been so bereft of them?
According to one 2008 report, ‘in the last ten years in Congo, hundreds of
thousands of women have been raped, most of them gang raped’. That
ten-year time span is itself significant, raising questions about where the
media have been. Dr Denis Mukwege, director of a local hospital, notes
that ‘the youngest was three years old’, while ‘the oldest was seventy-five’.
He adds: ‘You know, they’re in deep pain. But it’s not just physical pain.
It’s psychological pain that you can see. Here at the hospital, we’ve seen
women who’ve stopped living.’ Mukwege describes how soldiers, armed
33 See, e.g., Jon Leyne, ‘Iran’s dilemma over stoning’, report of 12 August 2010, at www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10956520 (accessed 26 February 2011).
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with machetes, attacked one woman. Despite her being pregnant, the
soldiers ‘just cut her at many places’, including her genitals.34
I am not suggesting that there is any easy template for the media to
follow. The relative significance and symbolism of human rights abuses
will always involve judgement calls. And yet, by the late twentieth
century, it became clear that it is the media’s neglect of the world’s most
egregious situations, from Congo, to Libya, to Belarus, to North Korea,
in comparison to those stories that attract exhaustive coverage, which
has generated a hyper-reality of human rights pervasively at odds with
their reality.
The number of people who systematically study professional human
rights reports, such as the published opinions of the UN treaty-based
committees, or reports by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,
Article 19 and other leading non-governmental organisations (NGOs),
as well as leading scholarly journals, is presumably slight, perhaps a few
thousand in the entire world. We can assume that they comprise only a
small minority even among those individuals who, either as politicians
or as experts, are involved in international affairs. Not even full-time
human rights professionals can easily keep pace with the sheer volume of
materials, outside their own areas of specialisation, in a way that would
constantly furnish them with a current, comprehensive overview of
global human rights. Beyond that small circle of human rights profes-
sionals, the numbers of politicians and diplomats both willing and able
to keep abreast of the specialised literature surely hovers around nought,
although it is they who hold the greatest power to make change. What
they know about human rights will draw largely from the media sources
that everyone else receives.
Human rights in Hollywood
Returning to an earlier example, international norms now strongly
condemn capital punishment and advocate its progressive elimination.35
At the same time, as has been suggested, we must compare the enormous
34 ‘War against women: the use of rape as a weapon in Congo’s civil war’, report of
17 August 2008, CBS News, available at www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/01/11/60minutes/
main3701249.shtml (accessed 26 February 2011).
35 See, e.g., Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, GA Res. 44/128, annex, 44
UN GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 207, UN Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force 11 July
1991, preamble, paras.4, 5 and 6.
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scale, and the concomitant time, effort, and costs, of the campaigns
against it, with the paucity of attention paid to countless global abuses,
exacting an exponentially greater number of victims. Once again, merely
to introduce that comparison raises suspicions that we may be lurching
towards positive indifference about the death penalty, or devaluing the
kinds of debate about criminal punishments that ought to occur in a
democratic society.
Kennedy’s example of the death penalty is also important in so far as,
among Western states, it now stands out as a distinctly American kind of
violation,36 in comparison to European states which have generally
abolished it.37 (Even in European states with voices favouring reinstate-
ment, few appear to feel strongly enough to make this a major issue.) In
2009, Amnesty International reported on the excessive suffering of
death-row inmates in Japan. Inmates enjoy no meaningful contact with
others, are left uninformed of the date of their execution, and develop
alarming levels of mental illness:
The government has a policy of not allowing access to prisoners on death
row and denied Amnesty International’s request for access . . . Each day
could be their last. The arrival of a prison officer with a death warrant
would signal their execution within hours. Some live like this year after
year, sometimes for decades . . . Apart from visits to the toilet, prisoners
are not allowed to move around the cell and must remain seated.38
For most people in the West and beyond, however, the face of the death
penalty in a prosperous society is more likely to be a film like Dead Man
Walking, or simply the routine diet of reports, documentaries and
television drama shows about capital punishment in the USA, than
anything from Japan. Rightly, Europeans in particular condemn the
36 Although only some US states currently impose the death penalty under general criminal
law, certain federal offences also provide for it. See UN Human Rights Committee,
‘Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America’,
UN Doc. A/50/40, paras.266–304 (1995), para.281.
37 See, e.g., Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circum-
stances (ETS No. 187), Vilnius, 3 May 2002. For global ratification information on
the ICCPR Second Optional Protocol, see UNO, ‘United Nations Treaty collection,
Chapter IV’ (note 2 above).
38 Amnesty International, ‘Japan continues to execute mentally ill prisoners’, report of
10 September 2009, at www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/report/japan-continues-
execute-mentally-ill-prisoners-20090910 (accessed 26 February 2011). See also, e.g. on
forced confessions, Norimitsu Onishi, ‘Pressed by police, even innocent confess in Japan’,
New York Times, report of 11 May 2007, at www.nytimes.com/2007/05/11/world/asia/
11japan.html (accessed 15 December 2010).
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persistence of the death penalty in the USA, particularly in view of
ongoing concerns about racism, poverty and adequate legal representa-
tion.39 However, recalling Kennedy’s reference to competing concerns,
throughout the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century
prison conditions in France have continued so poor as to prompt
hundreds of suicides.40 The numbers are not altogether disproportionate
to those of executed Americans, in view of the countries’ respective
populations. Yet there has been no pan-European, let alone global,
discussion of those French conditions.
If we care about differences between formal norms and actual condi-
tions, we might ask whether that French de facto condemnation to death
is much better than the American de jure one (or indeed whether it is not
worse, providing a more diffuse target than the formally sanctioned
norms or practices of capital punishment). While US criminal justice
has long been scrutinised for problems of racism, the traditional French
government policy of declining to compile statistics on citizens’ race,
religion or ethnicity has inevitably diminished the attention paid to
those issues within the prison context.41 The distinctly American image
of the death penalty presumably arises from its iconic status in Holly-
wood, together with Hollywood’s global reach, in contrast to the lack of
any comparable mediatisation of European or other global situations.
Small wonder that the USA has traditionally been so widely seen as
racist, certainly before President Obama’s electoral victory: not because
its racism or other abuses are so very different from those in other
complex, industrialised, multi-ethnic societies, but because it has been
far more mediatised. A colleague whose course covers racism in Britain
told me recently that he wanted to assign his students something other
than a British source, and was thinking about a novel by Alice Walker or
Toni Morrison. I told him both were good choices, but also very usual
ones, both within the USA and beyond. Why not choose a novel from
some country other than the USA? His face went blank.
Admittedly, the occasional news feature will focus outside the USA at
times of special flare-up, as in Rwanda, Bosnia or Tibet. Films like Hotel
39 See, e.g., Andre Kaspi, La peine de mort aux Etats-Unis (Paris, FR: Plon, 2003).
40 See, e.g., Ge´rald Andrieu, ‘L’administration pe´nitentiaire “camoufle”-t-elle des suicides?’
Marianne, 18 August 2009, at www.marianne2.fr/L-administration-penitentiaire-camoufle-
t-elle-des-suicides_a181826.html (accessed 26 February 2011).
41 See, e.g., Molly Moore, ‘In France, prisons filled with Muslims’, Washington Post,
29 April 2008, p.A–01, at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/04/28/
ST2008042802857.html (accessed 26 February 2011).
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Rwanda or The Last King of Scotland are perhaps stirring greater mass
awareness than we had seen in the past. Curiously, even those films
emphasise individuals at one remove from the carnage, without inviting
us into a Color Purple type of intimacy with victims, their families, or
their communities. More importantly, such coverage, still intermittent,
cannot compare to the rich palette of highly personalised, often intim-
ate, racially informed programming, from ‘Bill Cosby’ and ‘Oprah’, to
numerous and detailed documentaries on American slavery, to major
Hollywood films, which cross the globe, constantly evoking issues of race
in the American past and present. American introspection about racism
becomes global. French or Dutch introspection about racism remain, for
the most part, French or Dutch. As to Russian, Indian, Chinese, or
Japanese introspection, it is questionable how much had gone on at all
through their own mass media by the beginning of the new century,
let alone through any global distribution.
That strongly US-centred human rights consciousness may well
change, as European films like Made in Britain, La Haine or Gegen die
Wand, within a broader world-cinematic context, attract greater interest.
But such films are still consigned to art-house status as soon as they leave
home, and can scarcely boast global or even large European audiences.
One might expect that the US media would be admired for its pioneer-
ing role in dealing with race. To some degree, it probably is. Ironically,
however, it has also created a constant mental association of the USA
with racism and other forms of social injustice – an association not so
spontaneously drawn to other states, even those with worse records, that
lack such media presence. I have no reservation about that US image
per se, grounded as it is in an undeniable past and present. My objection,
rather, is that countless other racisms, countless other histories, count-
less other abuses throughout the world go mostly unfilmed, and so are
largely ignored.42
I have no illusion that in a state like Belgium human rights would or
should receive the attention lavished on the far larger and more powerful
USA. Nevertheless the EU increasingly functions, and wishes to be seen,
as a composite cultural entity. Given its fervently proclaimed human
rights aspirations, we should ask about how the history of racism,
including its colonial element, is communicated, not only with respect
42 Cf. generally Eric Heinze, ‘Truth and myth in critical race theory and LatCrit: human
rights and the ethnocentrism of anti-ethnocentrism’, 20 National Black Law Journal
(2006–7) 107.
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to any given European’s own country, but with respect to other
European countries, and how its media presence compares to that of
US racial history.
It would be dishonest for the EU to represent its cultural unity only in
reference to da Vinci and Proust, while presenting its darker elements,
past or present, merely as the unfortunate deviations of individual states.
It would be remarkable to argue that Mozart was a European but Hitler
an Austrian. However, that seems to be the dominant message. Any
assumption, for example, that Leopold II created only a Belgian history,
distinct from a European one, reflects not Leopold’s irrelevance to
Europe’s past and present, so much as Europeans’ own amnesia about
their fellow nations. Belgium, the EU’s primary host country, retains (in
Brussels, the EU ‘capital’ city) publicly displayed statues of Leopold II,
a monarch who implemented systematic murders of millions of
Congolese, along with routine chaining and amputations of both chil-
dren and adults, and the enslavement of virtually that entire population,
within just forty years (circa 1880–1920), for the sake of rubber and
other raw materials.43 To this day, that African history is taught and
discussed only minimally, if at all, among a European population which,
curiously, has often taken a keener interest in US racism than in that of
its own European neighbours (to be clear, then, I make that observation
not in reference to Europeans’ awareness of racism in their own home
countries, but in reference to their awareness of racismwithin EUmember
states other than their own). It is remarkable that today Europeans often
pay farmore attention to the history of theWest African slave trade, which
turns into a fundamentally American story, than to that Central African
history, which does not let Europe so easily off the hook.
The ongoing, murderous consequences for Central Africa, recently
tolling over three million dead, and countless others maimed, raped or
internally displaced, continue to this day.44 Both that history, and its
ongoing consequences, are scarcely discussed by modern Europeans (or
anyone else), who certainly do not commemorate it, and are indeed
mostly ignorant of it. A 2004 documentary, one of the very few of its
kind, still needed to recite the most basic facts, effectively introducing
them as a novelty.45 The BBC journalist Mark Dummett used that
occasion to comment:
43 See, e.g., Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost (New York: Mariner, 1998).
44 See, e.g., Okawa. ‘Congo’s war’, p.203. See also, e.g., ‘Congo death toll up to 3.8m’,
Guardian Unlimited; Polgreen, ‘War’s chaos steals Congo’s young by the millions’.
45 ‘Congo: white king, red rubber, black death’, London, UK: BBC, 2004 (dir. Peter Bate).
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Of the Europeans who scrambled for control of Africa at the end of the
nineteenth century, Belgium’s King Leopold II left arguably the largest
and most horrid legacy of all . . . He claimed he was doing it to protect the
‘natives’ from Arab slavers, and to open the heart of Africa to Christian
missionaries, and Western capitalists. Instead . . . the king unleashed new
horrors on the African continent.
He turned his ‘Congo Free State’ into a massive labour camp, made a
fortune for himself from the harvest of its wild rubber, and contributed in
a large way to the death of perhaps 10 million innocent people. What is
now called the Democratic Republic of Congo has clearly never recovered.
‘Legalised robbery enforced by violence’, as Leopold’s reign was described
at the time, has remained, more or less, the template by which Congo’s
rulers have governed ever since. Meanwhile Congo’s soldiers have never
moved away from the role allocated to them by Leopold – as a force to
coerce, torment and rape an unarmed civilian population.
As the BBC’s reporter in DR Congo, I covered stories that were loud
echoes of what was happening 100 years earlier, [which included] chil-
dren and adults whose right hands had been hacked off by [Leopold’s]
agents. They needed these to prove to their superiors that they had not
been ‘wasting’ their bullets on animals. This rule was seldom observed as
soldiers kept shooting monkeys and then later chopping off human
hands to provide their alibis.46
As a superpower, the USA has inevitably attracted greater attention
than any given EU member state. That is not entirely a bad thing.
We should indeed take a particular interest in the conduct of the
most powerful states. It is difficult, however, to justify that dispropor-
tionately greater attention strictly from the standpoint of human
rights. The EU counts as a composite entity, boasting a shared culture,
with a combined wealth and population greater than those of
the USA.47 It is implausible to imagine that either the history or the
ongoing realities of racism in Europe merit so much less European or
global interest.
Only European Nazism, increasingly associated more with a con-
cluded past than an ongoing present, receives both the quantity and
the dramatic quality of attention that is otherwise directed towards
US racism, in Europe, in the USA and throughout the world. The
46 Mark Dummett, ‘King Leopold’s legacy of DR Congo violence’, BBC News, 24 February
2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3516965.stm (accessed 15 August 2011).
47 For regular updates, see, e.g., European Commission, Eurostat, at http://epp.eurostat.ec.
europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home (accessed 26 February 2011); US Census
Bureau, at www.census.gov/compendia/statab/ (accessed 26 February 2011).
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extermination of Jews was so thorough that the tiny numbers who
survived in Europe, which represented a far smaller proportion of the
population after the Second World War than African Americans in the
USA, meant that European governments could make amends with
comparatively little complication or resistance. More importantly, any
Euro-American parity in the respective levels of media attention is
attained only because European Nazism and US racism were deeply
internal affairs. Europe’s Nazi atrocities, like America’s racist ones, were
committed largely on domestic minority populations. European ‘black/
white’ or ‘brown/white’ racism, by contrast, differs markedly from that
of the USA, having, until the later twentieth century, played out largely
on non-European soil. Before the Second World War, Europe’s racism
was of a wholly different order to American racism, its atrocities com-
mitted outside European frontiers and not experienced in any direct
sense by ordinary Europeans.
It is no surprise, then, that the internal racial tensions have not
festered, as they have in the USA over many years, making it far easier
for Europeans to ‘forget’ a past that they could so easily walk away from,
leaving the ‘natives’ to themselves. A Hollywood-style panorama of
Leopold’s Congo extending to the ongoing consequences, might spur
not only Americans, but also Europeans, to view Roots or In the Heat of
the Night within a far more nuanced global context than the strongly
US-centred media has ever provided. If a group of Germans or Austrians
were to raise a statue of Hitler in a public place, it would become a
European, arguably a global, media event, with hefty condemnation at
home and abroad, and likely legal sanctions. Within an hour, the statue
would be removed by law or by force. By contrast, in the very ‘capital’ of
the European Union, at the heart of one of Europe’s most materially
prosperous democracies, statues of Leopold II welcome officials from all
EU member states, without a word of European protest. Far from
condemnation, proud public commemoration of Leopold still takes
place. As recently as 2007, the Belgian Royal Mint issued commemora-
tive coins featuring his effigy. Astoundingly, in its handsomely presented
sales brochure, the Mint brushed aside the monarch’s atrocities in a
question-begging subordinate clause: ‘The second Belgian king is cer-
tainly, in view of his Congo policy, the most reviled (de meest verguisde)
of our heads of state . . .’. Given the brochure’s money-making aim, that
caveat serves more to add an edgy frisson than to evoke anything like a
memory of the monarch’s atrocities. The Mint’s aim is to honour the
king, not to shame him, praising his government’s period of ‘economic
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and cultural expansion’.48 The European press and populace scarcely
notice such chilling gestures. As of this writing, even the European
Commission against Racism and Intolerance, which should be most
vigilant about Europe’s historical memory, has taken no official stand
against these public honours commemorating the king.49 I have empha-
sised this Belgian example not least because of Belgium’s special status
within the EU, but others might be cited.50
The frequent attention of US film or television to issues of race
probably does have some progressive effect, promoting a more critical
awareness of those issues. The consciousness it promotes must surely
prompt some viewers to think about racism ‘generally’. Above all, how-
ever, it creates an immediate, and constantly reinforced, awareness of
racism in the USA. Other societies either actively prohibit any such
portrayals of themselves (for example, Western consciousness of the
Soviet Union and its allies generally focused on political repression, or
militarism, and not specifically on racism), or willingly accept such
works, but with nothing like the global distribution enjoyed by their
US counterparts. Racism in Western Europe, and around the world, may
well receive media attention, but rarely at the scale of The Color Purple or
Do the Right Thing.
A crucial insight of the US civil rights movement was to awaken us to
the dominant media’s inherent racism. Racism takes forms far beyond
the crudest insult and invective. More insidious, more effective, are the
media’s sheer absences and silences. In the twentieth century, popular US
sitcoms from I Love Lucy through to The Brady Bunch presented an all-
white America, on the heels of a long Hollywood tradition of either
excluding ethnic minorities, or featuring them in caricatured and
48 Koninklijke Munt van Belgie¨, MuntInfo, No. 45, October 2007, p.8, available at
http://treasury.fgov.be/intermunt/En/Muntinfo/MI45nl.pdf (accessed 26 February 2011)
(emphasis added).
49 Albeit formally attached, not to the European Union, but to the Council of Europe, there
can be no suggestion that the ECRI’s mandate would have no bearing upon European
states’ attitudes towards such gross historical incidents. For regularly updated policy
statements, see Council of Europe, European Commission against Racism and Intoler-
ance, www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/default_en.asp (accessed 26 February 2011).
50 Note also that most continental Europeans now learn English as their second language,
often from a very young age. Teachers seek materials that will spur students’ interest and
provoke thought, finding a treasure trove in both fictional and non-fictional accounts of
American cultural history, with its inevitable attention to race. For the most part, the
languages of former colonial powers, such as Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Dutch and
even French, along with many non-European languages, are increasingly neglected in the
race for English, attracting that same depth of interest only at more specialised levels.
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subservient, if not altogether demeaning, roles.51 That first wave of
silencing witnessed changes towards the end of the twentieth century,
as the mass media made more room for non-white faces. A reactionary,
right-wing view could be associated with nostalgia for the earlier images
and hostility towards alternative ones, as the left rightly pushed for
diversity.
Since that time, we have been living through a second wave of
silencing. If the US popular media have changed since the 1950s, one
thing has remained the same: overwhelmingly, coverage is about the
USA. That’s no shock. Popular media always include a strong local
component. Mass German audiences watch German serials, or chat or
variety shows; mass French audiences watch French serials, or chat or
variety shows; and so on. In recent years, Western European popular
media have paid increasing attention to issues of race and ethnicity at
home.
But a question arises about what the audiences view beyond their local
fare. What are popular (as opposed to elite) British, French, German or
Italian audiences watching when they are not watching home-grown
films or television shows? Are they watching each other’s, motivated by a
political and cultural interest in their own European neighbours? Euro-
pean elites may do so to a limited degree. Overwhelmingly, however, the
second media source for mass European and indeed global audiences is
American. The average German viewer will have seen more about racism
in the USA than about racism in fellow EU-member states France or
Italy; the average French viewer will have seen more about racism in the
USA than about racism in fellow EU-member states Italy or Germany;
and so on. Yes, German viewers will have seen the rioting in British cities
or French suburbs, in the form of routine news reports. They will not,
however, have fed upon the steady diet of more intimate, personalised,
fictionalised, or fly-on-the-wall exposure – the storytelling52 – which
they will have experienced about racism both in their own country and
in the USA. Meanwhile, the average US viewer (again, as distinguished
from small elites) will have seen little if anything about contemporary
social conflict either in Western Europe, or indeed in Russia, India,
Japan, Brazil or other places.
51 See generally, e.g., Clint C. Wilson et al., Racism, Sexism, and the Media: The Rise of Class
Communication in Multicultural America, 3rd edn (New York: Sage Publications, 2003);
John D. H. Downing and Charles Husband, Representing Race: Racisms, Ethnicity and the
Media (New York: Sage Publications, 2005).
52 Cf. Heinze, ‘Truth and myth in critical race theory and LatCrit’, pp.115–16 and 120–3.
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Solutions?
At several levels, including not just hard-news reporting but also, per-
haps more importantly, popular entertainment, the mass media generate
a hyper-reality pervasively at odds with the realities of global human
rights. It is the most repressive regimes who benefit most, and their
victims who lose most. That media-generated consciousness of human
rights becomes a far more powerful factor in actual discussions and
actions on human rights than most of what is done within the formally
legal confines of norms and institutions. Or, more precisely, it is the
media that too often determine the situations towards which, and away
from which, those norms and institutions are directed.
That failure to grasp the media’s role underscores lawyers’ ongoing
entrapment in legal formalisms. Human rights professionals and
scholars focus almost entirely on norms and institutions, paying too
little attention to the overwhelming force of the mass media in deter-
mining the use and abuse of those official channels. Remedies are
available, but only to a limited extent. Much of the mass media could
certainly redress some of the grosser imbalances, by injecting greater
diversity and even-handedness into their hard-news reporting. In con-
trast, the degree to which one might expect the entertainment industry
to diversify its topics, or the public to enjoy a greater range, is far from
clear.
As we have seen, the problem is not specific to the nature of human
rights norms. Any ethics that resists a zero-sum calculus, shunning the
idea that ethics towards some individuals or groups can only come at
the expense of ethics towards others, must inevitably be sacrificed on the
altar of the media’s own fiercely zero-sum game. That game remains
fundamentally damaging to the ethos of universal human rights, where
the sum is not zero. Yet the media will not shed that zero-sum approach
for as long as they retain anything like their familiar forms. Even the
internet age, which can overcome some of the shackles of traditional
editorial practices, scarcely offers a superior alternative, since informa-
tion turns into a scarcely filtered wasteland through which few can
navigate effectively.
At the very least, diplomats, activists and scholars must openly
acknowledge the limitations and distortions underlying even our well-
informed notions about global violations. Nevertheless, from states
conspicuously benefiting from those defects, few such acknowledge-
ments can be expected.
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